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RECENT DECISIONS
CONFLICT OF LAWS - DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT - U.S. LAW APPLIES TO
DEATH ACTION ARISING FROM CRASH OF FOREIGN AIRCRAFT ON HIGH SEAS. - Libel-
lants, executors of the estate of decedent, a New Jersey citizen, brought suit in
admiralty pursuant to Section I of the Death on the High Seas Act,1 alleging that
negligence of the respondent led to the decedent's death in a crash of an airliner of
Venezuelan registry about thirty miles off the coast of New Jersey. Respondent, a New
Jersey corporation, inspected and serviced the aircraft immediately before it left
Idlewild Airport on a scheduled flight to Venezuela. Respondent moved to dismiss the
libel urging that section 1 of the act did not create a cause of action for wrongful
death where, as here, the death occurred on board foreign aircraft over the high seas.
Respondent further contended that Venezuelan law, which does not recognize a cause
of action for wrongful death, should be applied under the traditional maritime law
principle that the law follows the flag. Held: motion denied. The libel states facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action under Section 1 of the Death on the High
Seas Act, as the most significant components of the wrong occurred within the
jurisdiction of the United States. Noel v. Airponents, Inc. 169 F. Supp. 348 (D.N.J.
1958).
Section 1 of the Death on the High Seas Act, passed in 1920, had as its general
purpose the creation of a cause of action for wrongful death occurring more than one
marine league from the coast of the United States. It was to supplant the common
law rule that a decedent's right of action for negligence leading to his death died with
him. Section 42 was enacted to abolish the limitation of liability imposed by federal law
regarding actions for death arising on foreign ships which were litigated in federal
courts under foreign law. 3 Suits under the act must be brought in admiralty4 but it
has been applied consistently to airplane-crash-death actions.5
Traditionally the place of the wrong, i.e., the place where the last event necessary
to make the actor liable for the alleged tort occurs, has been determinative of the law
to be applied in a tort action.6 In maritime law this view is expressed in the principle
that the law of the flag, the law of the ship's ownership or registry, will govern all
1 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1952):
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or de-
fault occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from shore of any
State ... the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for
damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty....
2 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 764 (1952):
Whenever a right of action is granted by the law of any foreign state on account
of the death by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring upon the high seas,
such right may be maintained in an appropriate action in admiralty in the courts
of the United States without abatement in respect to the amount for which re-
covery is authorized, any statute of the United States to the contrary not-
withstanding.
3 The statute was passed to overrule the holding the The Titanic, 233 U.S. 718 (1914). See
S. REP. No. 216, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1919): But as the Supreme Court has held that the
liability limitation statute of the United States applies to foreign vessels seeking
such limitation of liability in our courts, the Committee recommends that the
bill be amended by the insertion of a new section to be numbered section 4....
4 Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957).
5 See, e.g., Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 93 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Sierra v. Pan
Am. World Airways, 107 F. Supp. 519 (D. Puerto Rico 1952).
6 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914); Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194
U.S. 120 (1904); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
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internal matters while the ship is at sea.7 This principle is usually based on one of two
considerations: first, that the ship is constructively a part of its homeland, and therefore
the accident has constructively occurred in the homeland; and secondly, the rather
pragmatic consideration that since some law must apply, the law of the ship's owner-
ship is the most intelligent choice.8 However, the law of the flag has not been applied
in cases where the ship was within the territorial jurisdiction of the forum.9
Of the various theories of conflicts of laws, the law of the flag principle finds
its foundation in the vested rights theory advocated by Holmes, Cardozo and Beale. 10
However, a strict and unbending application of this theory in all situations seems un-
desirable. 1 This is particularly apparent where the forum state is asked to apply
foreign law to a wrong beginning within its territorial jurisdiction, the "last event"
of which occurs in another jurisdiction which does not recognize a cause of action for
the wrong. In such a situation the forum may rigidly adhere to the technical require-
ment of "last event" and deny recovery in accordance with the foreign law, or refuse
the formalism of this theory when unwarranted by the facts and apply its own law in
resolution of the controversy.12
This latter and more flexible approach has found favorable expression in practice.
For example, in Fernandez v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana' 3 (separate action arising
from the same crash as the instant case), the action was tried under the Death on the
High Seas Act, Section 1, disregarding the fact that both plaintiff and defendant were
Venezuelan citizens.14 The court said : "This power [to grant a right of action under
section 1] granted to the courts is applicable even though the wrong occurred in an
area not subject to the laws of the U.S." Again, in Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezo-
lana,15 a companion case of the instant decision, the same acceptance is indicated, al-
though the applicability of foreign law was not expressly decided. There the court ruled
that the Warsaw Convention was inapplicable to the case,16 and dismissed the libel
under Section 1 of the Death on the High Seas Act. But significantly, in dismissing the
claim under the act, the court did so without prejudice, and solely on the ground that
the case was not brought in admiralty. The court never discussed the applicability of
Venezuelan law over the United States statute. Under the vested rights theory, the court
could have dismissed the claim under the act on the fact that the death occurred on a
Venezuelan aircraft, thus requiring the Case to be tried under Venezuelan law. Mr.
Justice Holmes, a foremost advocate of the vested rights theory, indicated the flexibility
7 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Windelhuss's Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1886); Cain v.
Alpha, 35 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1929); The Oriskany, 3 F. Supp. 805 (D. Md. 1933).
8 Lauritzen v. Larsen, supra note 7, at 585.
9 Uravic v. Jarka, 282 U.S. 234 (1931); Shorter v. Bermuda, 57 F.2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
10 Cf. BEALE, SELzcrioNs FROM A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 15, at 4 (1935): "When-
ever a question arises concerning the recognition or enforcement of a right which, it is claimed,
accrued in another state, it must therefore be solved by the law of the state in which the question
arises."
11 COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 313-46 (1949); Currie,
On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 964 (1958).
12 See Coox, op. cit. supra note 11, at 328-41.
13 156 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
14 This analysis was criticized in 71 HARv. L. REv. 1152 (1958), where it was maintained that
the scope of § 1 was limited to those actions within the jurisdiction of the United States, and that
only § 4 can be utilized when foreign law is to be applied. This is correct, but it also assumes the
very issue in the case, i.e., whether foreign law applies. This criticism can be supported only if it
is assumed that the intention of Congress was to resolve the conflicts issue and adopt the law-of-the-
flag principle in § 1. But see Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 585 (1953), where the Court implied
that there might be circumstances when this principle would be inapplicable.
15 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957).
16 On this issue, the court stated that "the effect of Article 17 [of the Warsaw Convention, 49
Stat. 3000, 3005 (1934)] . .. was only to create a presumption of liability, leaving it for the local
law to grant a right of action." It appears that this same reasoning bars a recovery based on the
Warsaw Convention in the instant case. t,
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of the theory in his decision in The Titanic,'7 where he applied a United States liability
limitation' s to actions brought under the English wrongful death statute.19
The instant case stands in contradiction to the weight of authority when viewed
in terms of a strict compliance with the vested rights requirement of "last event." If, as
the proponents of this theory have contended, 20 the basis of any right for a tort of which
the lex loci delecti is a foreign country (or a foreign ship, since the law follows the
flag) is the law of that country and that law only, then the instant libellants could have
sued only under Venezuelan law, which would have left them remediless. The present
court recognized this principle but was not disposed to follow it, stating: "We are of
the opinion that there cannot be a slavish adherence to this principle, in total disregard
of other considerations, where the Court is called upon to resolve conflicts between
competing laws."2' In rejecting this principle, the court based its decision on Uravic v.
Jarka22 and Lauritzen v. Larsen,2 3 neither of which seems particularly favorable to the
court's position. In Uravic, the law of the United States was applied to a dispute between
a United States citizen and a foreign ship, but the dispute arose out of acts committed
and completed while the ship was docked in New York Harbor. Thus, federal law was
applied by virtue of territorial jurisdiction. In Lauritzen, the Court was asked to deter-
mine the applicability of Danish law in opposition to the Jones Act.24 But in this case
both libellant and repondent were Danish citizens, the ship was Danish, and libellant
had signed a contract upon entering service of the ship to the effect that all disp-ltes were
to be settled according to Danish law. However, in finding the Jones Act inapplicable,
the Court emphasized the principle that the law follows the flag when it said: "It is
significant to us that the weight given the ensign overbears most other connecting events
in determining the applicable law." 25
In terms of traditional conflict-of-laws theory and in terms of the court's authority,
the position of the instant court is rather weak. An analysis of the practical considera-
tions involved, however, demonstrates that this is a situation where the vested rights
requirement of "last event" should not find application. The more significant components
of the wrong were within United States' jurisdiction, except for the final act, the crash.
The respondent performed his service in the United States, and in ordinary contempla-
tion would be expected to conform to standards of federal law. The avowed policy of
Congress is to allow actions for wrongful death under the Death on the High Seas Act.
Most significantly, Venezuela was not involved in this dispute either as a Republic or
through one of her citizens. Viewed in this light, it appears that the instant decision is
correct in its rejection of the oversimplification implicit in an unbending application of
the vested rights theory. The court must be lauded for its balancing of tradition against
the practical factors at the heart of the case, and its finding that a just result is more
compelling than one which is technically impeccable.
Paul B. Coffey
COMMERCE CLAUSE - HOBBS ACT - UNION OFFICIAL'S EXTORTION OF MONEY
FROM EMPLOYER HAS POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE. - An owner
of a ready-mixed concrete business contracted to supply concrete for the construction of
a local steel mill, which, upon completion, would send its products into two other states.
Defendant, a labor union official, threatened the owner with the loss of this contract
unless he was given certain sums of money. Defendant was subsequently indicted and
17 The Titanic, 233 U.S. 718 (1914).
18 REv. STAT. §§ 4283-85 (1875).
19 Lord Campbell's Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93.
20 Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
21 169 F. Supp. at 350.
22 282 U.S. 234 (1931).
28 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
24 41 Stat 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
25 345 U.S. at 585.
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convicted of an alleged violation of the Hobbs Act,' whereupon he appealed, claiming
inter alia that his interference did not "affect" interstate commerce. Held, affirmed.
Interstate commerce was affected when defendant extorted money from an individual
who was to furnish material to be used in the construction of a steel mill, which, on
completion, would send its products into other states. United States v. Stirone, 262 F.2d
571 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 27 U.S.L. WEEK 3303 (U.S. April 28, 1959) (No.
722).
In 1934 Congress passed the Federal Anti-Racketeering Act2 to protect commerce
from racketeering after some of the states had demonstrated their inability or unwilling-
ness to do so.3 However, a proviso excepted activities involving employer-employee
relations. 4 The Hobbs Act was subsequently passed to remove this exception,5 and there-
fore its main purpose was to extend federal protection to persons coerced and in-
timidated by labor unions or their members. The authority utilized by Congress in
providing this protection was the commerce clause;6 thus the statute is limited by the
extent of this power. The basic issue in the instant case was whether the facts placed
this situation beyond the scope of this power. 7
For the first hundred years of our constitutional history the emphasis was on the
negative effects of the power of Congress to regulate commerce.8 The affirmative
possibilities were ignored mainly because Congress failed to exercise the power ex-
tensively until after the Reconstruction era.9 Early in this history Chief Justice Marshall
gave commerce a broad interpretation,' 0 but the Court later retreated from his position, 11
and it was not until the 1930's that the concept was really tested in time of crisis. It was
at first limited, 1 2 later expanded,' 3 and finally extended to its broadest and most compre-
hensive scope.1 4 At the present time commerce covers, at least, transportation of
persons'15 and things, 1 6 communication, 17 transportation of women for immoral pur-
poses,' 8 escaping witnesses, 1 9 and fleeing kidnapers. 20 The power is qualified, however,
by the word "interstate," a non-constitutional addition, which excludes matters local in
nature, the so-called intrastate commerce. 2 1 But a literal construction of the term inter-
1 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1952). The statute punishes "whoever in any way or degree obstructs,
delays or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery
or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do ..
2 48 Stat. 979 (1934).
3 See United States v. Local 807, Teamsters Union, 118 F.2d 684, 688 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd,
315 U.S. 521, 528-531 (1942), where the legislative history of the act is examined.
4 Federal Anti-Racketeering Act, ch. 569, § 6, 48 Stat. 979 (1934). There was some doubt of
the extension of this exception prior to 1942, but in United States v. Local 807, Teamsters Union,
315 U.S. 521, 530 (1942), the Court held that the act was intended to eliminate "terroristic activities
by professional gangsters," but not to interfere with traditional labor union activities, e.g., forcing
the employer to pay wages.
5 Cf. United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 421-422 (1956).
6 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
7 Numerous other errors were argued on appeal. However the scope of this article will include
only the alleged erroneous charge of the trial court. 262 F.2d at 574.
8 Even the classic case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) concerned the
limitation placed upon the states by the power.
9 FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WArr 8 (1937).
10 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824).
11 United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); see also Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918), which was expressly overruled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17
(1941).
12 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
13 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
14 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
15 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
16 Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U.S. 61 (1954).
17 Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933).
18 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
19 Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947).
20 Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936).
21 The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913).
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state is not the measure of the power granted Congress because, as the Supreme Court
explained in Wickard v. Filburn,22 even though an activity
be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce ... whether... "direct" or "indirect."23
In enacting the Hobbs Act, Congress intended to reach the perimeter of the power
.it possesses in this field. 24 Consequently, in the application of this act, courts have had
no trouble finding interference with interstate commerce when the affected transporta-
tion crosses state lines.2 5 Convictions have been affirmed against state officers, who,
under the guise of enforcing state laws, extorted money from employers and their truck
drivers,2 6 of labor leaders who threatened to halt the unloading of sugar from ocean-
going vessels, 27 and of a business agent who stopped the unloading of an interstate
shipment and insisted that a union member do the unloading.28 Hulahan v. United
States,29 however provides the frame of reference for the indirect interference with
commerce which complicated the instant case. In Hulahan the interference was occa-
sioned by a labor union official's extortion of money from several local construction
companies which were working on the construction of a flour mill and an airport, both
of which would not affect interstate commerce until completed. In affirming the con-
viction, the court emphasized Congress' power to deal with interferences which "actually"
or "potentially" affect interstate commerce and stated that interference with contractors
"who are engaged in constructing facilities to serve commerce, is ... proscribed by the
[Hobbs Act]."30
With these precedents the court had ample authority to support a finding of inter-
ference with interstate commerce under the instant facts. However, in support of its
decision, the court used several cases concerning the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938,31 principally Mitchell v. C. W. Vollmer & Co.32 In this decision the Supreme
Court held that employees working on the construction of a water lock, which, when
completed, would improve interstate avenues of transportation were "engaged in
commerce within the meaning of the act." But it should be noted that this case is a
narrow exception to the "new construction rule" which has been applied in countless
FLSA cases,33 whereby original construction is said not to be within the coverage of
that statute even though the building would ultimately be used in conjunction with
interstate commerce. 34 Logically, then, one must admit that construction of a steel mill
would fall within this rule and not within the narrow exception covering "improvement
of a facility or instrumentality of interstate commerce."35 The dissent correctly
criticized the majority for its use of these cases, but in turn used the same cases to
formulate a contrary opinion.
Both opinions fail to realize that there is a substantial difference in the area pur-
ported to be encompassed by the two statutes. In the Hobbs Act, Congress, by express
language, evidenced the intention that their implementation of the commerce power be
22 317 U.S. 111 (1941).
23 Id. at 125.
24 The definition of commerce in the act concludes with the following phrase: "and all other
commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3) (1952).
25 U.S. v. Sweeney, 262 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1959); United States v. Postma, 242 F.2d 488 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 922 (1957); United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 882 (1956).
26' Ladner v. United States, 168 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1948).
27 United States v. Varlack, 225 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1955).
28 United States v. Kemble, 198 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 893 (1952).
29 214 F.2d 441 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856 (1954).
30 Id. at 445.
31 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (Supp. V, 1958).
32 349 U.S. 427 (1955).
33 Hartmaier v. Long, 238 S.W.2d 332, 336 n.9, cert. denied, 342 U.S. 833 (1951) contains
an extensive collection of such cases.
34 Hartmaier v. Long, supra note 33, at 336.
35 Mitchell v. C. W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427, 430 (1955).
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coextensive with the constitutional grant extending coverage to "all... commerce over
which the United States has jurisdiction." whereas the Fair Labor Standards Act was
expressly limited to those workers "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce. . .3.6 The majority, therefore, was more justified in rejecting the
applicability of the "new construction rule"3' 7 to the Hobbs Act than the dissent in its
insistence upon application of the rule to the instant situation. The majority's use of
Mitchell and allied FLSA cases does serve to support the assertion that a potential effect
on commerce is sufficient, but more appropriate authority could have been utilized.38
The opinion in the case in comment is open to analytical objections although the
decision is justified by precedent and the historical evolution of the commerce clause.
The use of FLSA cases was an unfortunate choice since the "new construction rule"
still has life in that field. The iule is not constitutional doctrine but is a practical
indication of activities not covered by one particular statute. Since the Hobbs Act is a
much broader exercise of congressional power over commerce, the decisions enunciat-
ing the "new construction rule" are not controlling. The court's extension of the power
of Congress under this act to reach activities which have a potential effect on interstate
commerce is clearly correct and vitally necessary. Since the states have demonstrated
their unwillingness or inability to act, federal action based on the commerce power is
desirable if racketeering of "the predatory criminal gangs of the Kelly and Dillinger
types"3 9 or by labor union officials who use their great power for improper purposes is
to be effectively controlled.
Joseph A. Marino
COPYRIGHT - DRESS DESIGNS - DESIGN PRINTED ON DRESS FABRIC IS PROPER
SUBJECT OF COPYRIGHT. - Plaintiff, a manufacturer of dress fabrics, copyrighted an
original fabric design. The design was described in the copyright application as a
"work of art." Shortly afterwards, defendant marketed cloth substantially identical
to plaintiff's form both in color and design, but at a lower price. Plaintiff moved to
enjoin the further manufacture and marketing of defendant's print on the grounds
of copyright infringement and irreparable injury. Held: motion granted. A design
printed upon a dress fabric is a proper subject of copyright both as a "work of art"
and as a "print." Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Brenda Fabrics, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 142
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Manufacturers of dress fabrics have long sought copyright protection for their
fabric designs. The very nature of the industry makes the originality of these designs
critical since the designs of themselves often do the selling, and the commercial life of
the design is usually ephemeral, often lasting less than six months. Under the common.
law, the product of one's imagination, intelligence and skill was a vested property right
protected by copyright.1 However, this protection was extinguished by general publica-
tion; the creator was deemed to have willed his originality to the public domain to be
copied by anyone for any purpose. 2 The nature of the fabric industry demands that
the dress fabric designs be "published" immediately to be profitable, which renders
36 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (3) (1952). See note 24 supra.
37 Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1952).
38 See cases cited in notes 14 & 29 supra; cf. United States v. Dale, 223 F.2d 181 (7th Cir.
1955), in which a petition for enlargement on bal was denied for want of a substantial question
for appeal. This ruling followed a conviction under the Hobbs Act for a conspiracy to obstruct
the construction of a power plant which upon completion would furnish electric power for an
atomic energy plant in another state, and for extortion from a subcontractor working on this
construction.
39 United States v. Local 807, Teamsters Union, 315 U.S. 521, 530 (1942).
1 Weikart, Design Piracy, 19 I. LJ. 235, 241 (1944).
2 Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 114 F,2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940).
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meaningless the common law copyright. Consequently, over the years the technique of
design "copying" has evolved to such a degree that as quickly as the design is marketed,
a "copy" appears to compete with it.a
As a result, the manufacturers have looked elsewhere for protection. The theory
of unfair competition seems to be precluded at this date.4 The one approach which
has met with some measure of success is that of the statutory copyright. The present
copyright statute, based in the main on the Copyright Act of 1909, 5 includes thirteen
subsections classifying the subject matter permitted to be copyrighted. 6 Of these, sub-
section (g) is claimed to favor dress designs in providing for the copyrighting of
"works of art; models or designs for works of art." The manufacturer insists that his
fashions or designs are "works of art" within the meaning of the act. The article in
question in the instant case also brings into play subsection (k) providing copyright
for "prints and pictorial illustrations including prints or labels used for articles of
merchandise." The article is a dress fabric whose design may be a "work of art," but
the design itself is also printed on the dress fabric and may be a protected "print."'7
The copyrightability of designs for dress fabrics was first adjudicated in 1929 in
Kemp & Beatley, Inc. v. Hirsch.8 In this case, plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from
copying a dress pattern which plaintiff had copyrighted as a "work of art." The court,
relying on an 1880 case involving pattern prints of balloons, 9 held that a design for
dress goods, whether stamped on paper or on the goods themselves, was not copy-
rightable as a "work of art." Subsequent courts have been in accord with this view
and have consistently held that articles of wearing apparel are not works of art. 10 The
tenor of the opinions and periodicals on the subject indicats that Congress has been
apprised of the problem of design piracy in the field of wearing apparel," but thus
far no legislation has been passed to amend the copyright laws and provide a solution.
As a result, the courts have refused to extend copyright protection through judicial
interpretation to obviate the difficulty.' 2
The last decision on point prior to the instant case was Verney Corp. v. Rose
Fabric Converters Corp.,'3 decided in 1949, where plaintiff had copyrighted a design
for use upon textiles as a commercial print. The court held that plaintiff's copyright
was invalid since the design was printed and used as part of the merchandise itself and
not merely in connection with its sale and advertisement. The court also stated that this
was an attempt by plaintiff to obtain a monopoly of the design in the manufacture of
dress fabrics and dresses, to which it was not entitled. It should be noted that the plain-
tiff in Verney had copyrighted its design as a "commercial print." This should not be
confused with one of the issues in the instant case, i.e., the copyrightability of a dress
fabric design as a "print."'14
3 See Young, Freebooters in Fashions, 9 ASCAP COPYRIoHT LAw SYMPOSIUM 76 (1958).
4 Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
5 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
6 17 U.S.C. § 5(a)-(m) (1952).
7 Prints may also come within the language of the design patent provision of the Patent Law.
35 U.S.C. § 171 (1952). However the laborious and time-consuming process of obtaining a patent
has made it useless to the fabric industry. Cf. Pogue, Borderland - Where Copyright and Design
Patent Meet, 6 ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSiuM 8-10 (1955).
8 34 F.2d 291 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
9 Rosenback v. Dreyfuss, 2 Fed. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1880).
10 Belding Hemingway Co. v. Future Fashions, 143 F.2d 216, 218 (2d Cir 1944); White v.
Leanore Frocks, 120 F.2d 113, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1941); Nat Lewis Purses v. Carole Bags, 83 F.2d
475, 476 (2d Cir. 1936); see also Young, supra note 3, at 85.
11 See Weikart, supra note 1, at 245-51.
12 Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929).
13 87 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
14 A "commercial print" is a print published in connection with the sale or advertisement of
an article or articles of merchandise. 37 C.F.R. § 202.14(b) (Supp. 1958). A "print" is a work
usually produced by lithographic or similar process from drawings or sketches which serve no
further purpose than as a basis for the reproduction. 37 C.F.RL § 202.14(a) (Supp. 1958).
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In recent years the fabric and garment industry has been given encouragement in
its struggle for copyright protection in this area through a gradual expansion of the
"work of art" concept. The expansion began in 1948 when the copyright office promul-
gated a new regulation broadening the definition of "work of art" to include the artistic
aspects of jewelry, glassware, tapestries, and other works of applied arts.15 The current
Regulations of the Copyright Office, published in 1956, are even more favorable. The
section defining "works of art" included the following:
In order to be acceptable as a work of art, the work must embody some
creative authorship in its delineation or form. The registrability of a work of art is
not affected by the intention of the author as to the use of the work, the number of
copies reproduced, or the fact that it appears on a textile material or textile product.16
The courts have also begun to take a more liberal approach to the problem. One
court, in holding that ceramic models of a cocker spaniel were copyrightable, re-
emphasized the principle that it was not the subject but the subject's treatment that is
protected. 17 Another court was of the opinion that "original" in reference to copyright
works meant little more than that the particular work owed its origin to the particular
author, and that no large measure of novelty was necessary.' 8 From the often-cited
case of Mazer v. Stein,19 involving the copyrightability of lamp statuettes, came the
proposition that the intended use of an article does not preclude copyright protection.
In 1955, two cases were decided which may be in favor of extending copyright
protection to fabric and garment designs. 20 In the first case, Ruston v. Vitale,21 plain-
tiff had copyrighted a doll in the form of a chimpanzee named "Zippy." The doll had
been marketed in order to take advantage of a seasonal demand created by a popular
television program on which "Zippy" appeared. The court, after deciding that "mere
judges can hardly risk condemning Zippy for lack of artistry and thus prove themselves
false prophets to the far-flung faithful Howdy Doody audience," 22 reversed a lower
court decision which denied plaintiff injunctive relief. In its opinion, the court said that
"copyright protection extends to any production of any originality and novelty, regard-
less of its commercial exploitation or lack of artistic merit."'23
In the second case, Trifari Kressmann & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co.,24 defendant
plagiarized plantiff's design for costume jewelry which had been copyrighted as a
"work of art." Characterizing plaintiff's product as "junk jewelry," defendant con-
tended that the copyright was invalid because the jewelry did not "rise to the dignity
of a work of art." The court, in granting plaintiff a preliminary injunction, stated that
the statutory concept "work of art" need not be an expression of "pure" or "fine" art.
"All that is needed is that the author contribute more than a mere trivial variation,
something recognizably his own."2 5
The instant court made no mention of past decisions concerning the copyright-
ability of fabric and garment designs. It did adopt, however, the interpretation of
"work of art" as stated by Dr. Herbert Putnam in 1906 and cited in the recent Supreme
Court case of Mazer v. Stein:26
The term 'works of art' is deliberately intended as a broader specification than
'works of the fine arts' in the present statute with the idea that there is subject-matter
15 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(a) (1949).
16 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (Supp. 1958).
17 F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 193 F.2d 162 (1st Cir. 1951). This prin-
ciple was formulated by Justice Holmes in Bleisten v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239 (1903).
18 Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
19 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
20 See Young, supra note 3, at 86.
21 218 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1955).
22 Id. at 436.
23 Id. at 435.
24 134 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
25 Id. at 553.
26 347 U.S. 201, 213 (1954).
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(for instance, of applied design, not yet within the province of design patents), which
may properly be entitled to protection under the copyright law.27 (Emphasis added.)
The court then concluded that the scope of the term "work of art" encompassed applied
designs and that the design in question was properly a subject of copyright both as a
work of art and as a print.
Because of the expansion of copyright protection through copyright office regula-
tions and the recent liberal interpretation of the "work of art" concept by the courts,
the Verney case and those preceding it2s have lost their validity as controlling pre-
cedents in this area. The instant decision provides a definite solution to a major problem
in the textile industry. Because the design is the sum and substance of commercial suc-
cess in the industry, manufacturers incur great expense in obtaining distinctive designs
for their products. Due to the ephemeral nature of these designs, copying by a
competitor jeopardizes the manufacturer's opportunity to recover the investment and
retain the profit of his efforts. Copyright protection is ideal for this type of industry.
There seems to be no logical reason to aid design pirates by a further denial of this
needed protection.
But the disturbing aspect of this decision is not the correctness of its application
of a copyright on the instant facts, but rather its probable precedent. The decision will
evidently be heralded as an intelligent progression of the trend toward extending copy-
right to the fabric industry. The next step will be the fashions themselves. However,
it is difficult to discern the beneficial aspects of strangling the garment industry by ex-
tending protection to the monopolistic property rights of a Dior or Cassini in such
creations as the "New Look." Prior to such an extension, careful thought should be
given to its effect on the industry and the ultimate consumer. Perhaps a middle ground
can be struck via the regulations and court decisions to give as much protection to the
property right of "originality" as is warranted by the common good.
Thomas Kavadas, Jr.
CRIMINAL LAW - EUTHANASIA - DEFENDANT ALLOWED TO WITHDRAW GUILTY
PLEA OF MANSLAUGHTER TO ACCOMMODATE FINDING OF NOT GUILTY ON ARRAIGN-
MENT. - Sixty-nine-year-old defendant suffocated his wife, a hopelessly crippled bed-
ridden arthritic. In arraignment proceedings in the trial court, the state waived the
murder charge and permitted the defendant to enter a plea of guilty to manslaughter.'
The court found the defendant guilty of manslaughter on the defendant's stipulated
admission of the killing. After hearing testimony of defendant's children and pastor
concerning his unfailing care and devotion during the deceased's two-year illness, and
a letter from her doctor attesting to her excruciating pain and mental despair, the
court allowed the defendant to withdraw his plea and entertained a plea of not guilty.
Held, not guilty. Because, under the circumstances, a jury "would not be inclined"
to convict, and because there was no reason to be concerned about recidivism as to
this or any other crime, the court withheld the "stigma" of a finding of guilty and
allowed the defendant "to go home . . . and live out the rest of [his] life in as much
peace as [he] can find it in [his] heart to have." People v. Werner, Criminal No. 58-
3636, Cook County Ct., Ill., Dec. 30, 1958.
27 Arguments before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and House of Representatives,
conjointly, on S. REP. No. 6330 and H.R. REP. No. 19853, To Amend and Consolidate the Acts
Respecting Copyright, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1906). Dr. Putnam was then the Librarian of
Congress.
28 Cases cited notes 4, 7, 9 & 12 supra.
1 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 364 (Smith-Hurd 1934).
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The instant case is another in a steadily expanding galaxy of examples of apparent
disrespect for the written law in euthanasia cases.2 A brief examination of the more
featured cases discloses the impact of this charge. The Greenfield case,3 the Repouille
case,4 and the celebrated New Hampshire case of Dr. Sander, 5 all exemplify verdicts
returned in open disregard of the facts. 6 Others, such as the Brownhill case,7 the
Johnson case,8 the Noxon case,9 the Long case,10 the Paight case, 1 and the Braunsdorf
case,' 2 illumine the means often utilized to exonerate an accused through the con-
venient niches of "temporary insanity" and executive clemency existing under our
present system of criminal law. The exceptions to this leniency are few, the classic
example being the early case of Rex v. Simpson.13
2 "The Law in Action is as malleable as the Law on the Books is uncompromising." Kamisar,
Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 969,
971 (1958). See also Silving, Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. PA. L. REV.
350, 353 (1954); see notes 3-12 infra.
3 Louis Greenfield chloroformed his imbecile son to death. N.Y. Times, May 9, 1939, p. 48,
col. 1. Although the District Attorney did not want to prosecute the case, Time, Jan. 23, 1939, p. 24,
Greenfield was tried and acquitted of first degree manslaughter, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1939, p. 1, col. 6.
4 Repouille read the account of the Greenfield case and did likewise, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1939,
p. 25, col. 7, and was found guilty of manslaughter in the second degree. N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1941,
p. 27, col. 7. He was subsequently freed on suspended sentence of 5-10 years. N.Y. Times, Dec.
25, 1941, p. 44, col. 1.
5 In Dr. Sander's own notation he related that he had given the patient "ten cc of air intra-
venously four times," and that the patient died only after these injections. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1950,
p. 15, col. 5. The nurse in attendance testified that the patient was still "gasping" when Sander
injected the air. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1950, p. 1, col. 2. Yet, Sander was acquitted, N.Y. Times,
March 10, 1950, p. 19, col. 2; and, although his license to practice medicine was revoked, it was
soon restored. N.Y. Times, June 29, 1950, p. 31, col. 6.
6 See Judge Learned Hand's remarks in Repoullle v. U.S., 165 F.2d 152, 153 (2d Cir. 1941),
referring to a jury verdict of second degree manslaughter as "utterly absurd."
7 Mrs. Mary Brownhill murdered her thirty-one-year-old imbecile son by giving him an over-
dose of aspirins and placing a gas tube in his mouth. The Times (London), Oct. 2, 1934, p. 11,
col. 2. Although sentenced to death (with a strong recommendation of mercy), The Times (London),
Dec. 3, 1934, p. 11, col. 4, she was reprieved two days later, The Times (London), Dec. 4, 1934,
p. 14, col. 2, and subsequently pardoned and set free in response to national sentiment. The Times
(London), March 4, 1935, p. 11, col. 3; N.Y. Times, March 3, 1935, p. 3, col. 2.
8 Harry C. Johnson asphyxiated his cancer-stricken wife, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1938, p. 1, col. 3;
!Oct. 3, 1938, p. 34, col. 3 Psychiatrists adjudged him "temporarily insane" at the time of the
killing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1938, p. 30, col. 4, and a few days later the grand jury refused to
indict him. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1938, p. 46, col. 1.
9 John Noxon, a lawyer, electrocuted his six-month-old mongoloid son, claiming it was an
jaccident. N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1943, p. 27, col. 2; Sept. 29, 1943, p. 23, col. 7; Oct. 29, 1943, p. 21,
col. 7; Jan. 14, 1944, p. 21, col. 3; July 7, 1944, p. 30, col. 2; July 8, 1944, p. 24, col. 1. He was
,convicted of first degree murder, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1944, p. 30, col. 2, but his sentence was
commuted to life, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1946, p. 42, col. 4. Then, to make parole possible, sentence
was further commuted to 6 years - life, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1948, p. 13, col. 5. Noxon was
paroled shortly thereafter, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1949, p. 16, col. 3; Jan. 8, 1949, p. 30, col. 4, and was
disbarred the following year. N.Y. Times, May 30, 1950, p. 2, col. 7.
10 Gordon Long gassed his deformed and imbecile seven-year-old daughter to death. Time, Dec.
2, 1946, p. 32. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death, but within a week his sentence was
commuted to life imprisonment. The Times (London), Nov. 23, 1946, p. 2, cal. 7; p. 15; Newsweek,
p. 2, col. 7.
11 Carol Paight killed her father after his cancer operation. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1950, p. 30,
col. 1; Feb. 1, 1950, p. 54, col. 3; Feb. 2, 1950, p. 22, col. 5; Time, Feb. 6, 1950, p. 15; Newsweek,
Feb. 13, 1950, p. 21. She was acquitted on grounds of temporary insanity.
12 Eugene Braunsdorf shot his spastic daughter and then attempted suicide. He was found not
guilty by reason of temporary insanity. N.Y. Times, May 23, 1950, p. 25, col. 4; Time, June 5,
1950, p. 20.
13 11 Crim. App. R. 218, 84 LJ.K.B. (n.s.) 1893 (1915). Defendant was convicted of murder
for cutting the throat of his son who was seriously ill and not expected to recover. The trial judge,
in instructing the jury stated that intentional killing was murder, and they were not at liberty to
find a verdict of manslaughter, though the prisoner killed the child "with the best and kindest
motive." See also Repoulle v. U.S., 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1941) (an alien who performed euthanasia
on his son denied citizenship as not being a person of "good moral character"); People v. Roberts,
211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920) (defendant convicted of murder and sentenced to life im-
prisonment for assisting his wife in her suicide by placing Paris Green at her disposal).
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Although it is readily noticeable that the majority of these cases do not involve
physicians or surgeons, this is not to imply that doctors refrain from euthanasia. Un-
fortunately, because of their position and their specialized knowledge, it is next to im-
possible to attribute the death of an "incurable" patient to euthanasia.1 4 Those who ad-
vocate the legalization of euthanasia through state legislation openly admit it is being
done, and consequently are interested primarily in legalizing this practice only for mem-
bers of the medical profession.15 And, were we to accept unquestioningly their statistics,
it would seem as if their aim expressed the will of the medical profession, if not that
of the general public.16 In reality, the situation is exactly the reverse.'
7
The movement for legalizing "mercy-killing" is tenacious, however, and cannot
be disregarded. It is based upon a purely pragmatic argument which recognizes no right
to "live" unless one can "live well." As a result, it can be annihilated at the same
pragmatic level without resorting to the customary moralistic attack. One has merely
to weigh the alleged advantages of "voluntary" euthanasia (i.e., where the infirm con-
sents) with two apparent disadvantages: (1) the possibility of mistake, and (2) the
possibility of abuse.' 8
Because of the possibility of mistake, even the layman, with but a cursory knowl-
edge of scientific progress, would expect a doctor to be loath to contend that his
diagnosis of a case as "incurable" was final unless he were simultaneously to admit that
medical advancement has become both "stationary and sterile."'19
The possibility of abuse is the more alarming problem, and it is not a satisfactory
retort to contend that only "voluntary" euthanasia is advocated. Even today, one has
but to look at the heralded cases to see that the "overwhelming majority of known or
alleged 'mercy-killings' have occurred without the consent of the victim."' 20 The Nazi
euthanasia program shows to what length such a system can be carried. 21 The program
begins with those who are a nuisance to themselves; it comes to a crashing finale with
the painless disposition of those who are a nuisance to others. 22 Even were a doctor
to ignore the above two possibilities, could he, in good conscience, disregard that part
of the Hippocratic Oath which reads: "I will ... abstain from whatever is deleterious
and mischievous. I will give no deadly medicine to any one if asked, nor suggest any
such counsel."? 2 '
The apparent present impregnability of "mercy-killers" is far removed from their
conceptual legal status, for under both English and American codifications of the
criminal law, "voluntary" euthanasia is murder for the person who administers, and
suicide for the person who consents.24 A fortiori, the perpetrator of an "involuntary"
14 G. WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 325-27 (1957).
15 G. Williams, Mercy-Killing Legislation - A Rejoinder, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1, 9 (1958); Mc-
Cormick, Murder Will Out, N.Y. CATHOLIC INFORMATION Soc'y 7 (1947).
16 See G. WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 331-32; 16 U. CHI. L. Rav. 141 n.11 (1948).
17 See 169 H.L. Deb. (5th ser.) 522-98 (1950); 103 H.L. Deb. (5th ser.) 466-505 (1936), which
point up the legislative opposition to the legalization of euthanasia; 96 AMERICAN 573 (1957), where
the results of a recent petition of New Jersey doctors point out that 98% of them refused to endorse
the petition for legalizing euthanasia; McCormick, Legalized Mercy Killing, Moral or Immoral, N.Y.
CATHOLIC INFORMATION Soc'Y 6-7 (1947); N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1950, p. 22, col. 4, which reported
that the General Assembly of the World Medical Association approved a resolution recommending
that all national associations "condemn the practice of euthanasia under any circumstances."
IS Kamisar, supra note 2, at 976.
19 Emerson, Who is Incurable? A Query and Reply, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1933, § 8, p. 5, col. 1.
See generally, Wolbarst, Legalize Euthanasia! 94 THE FORUM 330 (1935); Kamisar, supra note 2, at
998, 1013.
20 Kamisar, supra note 2, at 1020.
21 Ivy, Nazi War Crimes of a Medical Nature, 33 FaD. BULL. 133-34 (1947).
22 Chesterton, Euthanasia and Murder, 8 AM. REV. 487 (1937).
23 Taylor, Annotations on the Oath of Hippocrates and the Geneva Version of the Hippocratic
Oath, 23 LINACRE 0. 34 (1956). The author points out that this section of the Oath "is a con-
demnation of euthanasia."
24 See G. WILLIAMS, op. cit. supra note 14, at 318; 2 BuRncK, LAW OF CRIMES §§ 422, 447
(1946); PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 721 (1957).
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mercy-killing is guilty of murder, despite his altruism. 25 Illinois is no exception. 26
Some European countries have adopted different legal approaches to this problem, but
they have not found acceptance in common law jurisdictions. 27
At the present time the question of non-feasance presents the only possible valid
legal argument for euthanasia advocates. 28 . Perhaps they can find some solace in the
late Pope Pius XIs statement that a doctor is not obligated to use 'extraordinary
means to save a life which is "ebbing hopelessly."'29 Yet, if there is a legal duty to act,
deliberate non-feasance with intent to cause death is usually classified as murder,30 and
negligent non-feasance as manslaughter. 3'
The court in the instant case appears to have based its decision largely on the
motive of the defendant, apparently believing that the type of motive which determines
the defendant's act has an important bearing on the character of the defendant.3 2 Al-
though there is wisdom in this approach, since it is not likely that a mercy-killer will
become a recidivist, the fact remains that at the present time motive is not an essential
criminal component either under the homicide law of Illinois,3 3 or in American
jurisprudence generally, for it is seldom recognized as an element of a crime or a
defense to it.34
The procedure followed by the court in the instant case appears unauthorized. Al-
though the defendant pleaded guilty to the manslaughter charge while aware of the
implications of such a plea, the court, apparently looking askance at its statutory duty
in such an instance,35 permitted him to withdraw his plea and substitute that of "not
guilty." It is true that the court in its discretion may permit the defendant to withdraw
a plea of "guilty" to the indictment although he pleaded with a full understanding of
the charge against him.3 6 But, the discretion thus left with the judge is limited to those
particular instances "where it appears that there is doubt of his guilt, or that he has any
defense at all worthy of consideration by a jury, or that the ends of justice will best
be served by submitting the case to a jury .... ,37 (Emphasis added.) The first two
criteria are obviously not present in the instant case. Nor is the third if we equate "ends
of justice" with "justice under law." Besides, it is evident that the trial judge in the
instant case had no intention of submitting the case to the jury after he allowed the
plea of guilty to be withdrawn.
Without speculating as to the people's right to a new trial,3 8 or the possibility that
the court usurped the executive pardoning power,3 9 the most that can be said for the
court's action is that it exemplifies the unfortunate ability of "sociological jurisprudence"
25 Silving, supra note 2, at 352.
26 ILL. ANx. STAT. ch. 38, § 358 (Smith-Hurd 1934): "Murder is the unlawful killing of a
human being . . . with malice aforethought, either express or implied. The unlawful killing may be
perpetrated by poisoning, . . . or by any of the other various forms or means by which human
nature may be overcome and death thereby occasioned." (Emphasis added.)
27 See Silving, supra note 2, at 350, 386-89.
28 Id. at 360: "One might argue that since the physician's duty to act is contractual and
predicated upon the patient's consent, there being no basis in such instances for presumptive consent,
non-feasance should go completely unpunished even though active euthanasia remains punishable."
29 N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1957, p. 1, col. 3.
30 Commonwealth v. Hall, 322 Mass. 523, 78 N.E.2d 644 (1948).
31 People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P.2d 92 (1947).
32 But see Repouille v. U.S., 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1941), where the court held that an alien
who performed euthanasia was not of the "good moral character" required for citizenship.
33 People v. Wagner, 390 Ill. 384, 61 N.E.2d 354 (1945).
34 See State v. Beard, 16 NJ. 50, 106 A.2d 265, 270 (1954); State v. King, 226 N.C. 241, 37
S.E.2d 684 (1946); State v. Taylor, 356 Mo. 1216, 205 S.W.2d 744 (1947).
35 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 732 (Smith-Hurd 1934): "... if the party persists in pleading
'guilty', such plea shall be received and recorded, and the court shall proceed to render judgment
and execution thereon, as if he had been found guilty by a jury." (Emphasis added).
36 People v. Throop, 359 Ill. 354, 194 N.E. 553 (1935); People v. Wheeler, 349 Ill. 230, 181
N.E. 623 (1932).
37 People v. Kleist, 311 Ill. 179, 142 N.E. 486 (1924).
38 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 747 (Smith-Hurd 1934): "in no criminal case shall the people be
allowed a new trial."
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to expand itself to the limit of its logic in an attempt to align the law with what is be-
lieved to be the public sentiment. To the other extreme, however, it reflects the anomaly
of judges who, as triers of fact and law, render a verdict flatly in the face of both, ap-
parently not realizing that "the public policy as expressed by legislative acts is not a
matter for the courts. Their duty is to apply the law as they find it."40
Demands for legalizing euthanasia coupled with results similar to People v.
Werner justify a closer scrutiny of the present law as it applies to "mercy-killers."
Recent efforts in both England and the United States to re-classify those acts which
should be punishable amply demonstrate that the trend of modem criminal law is to
utilize punishment discriminately. 41 The manner in which both judges and juries are
now disposing of euthanasia cases further exemplifies this trend. Yet their disposition
of the cases is inadequate by present legal standards since euthanasia falls under the
classification of "premeditated homicide." This dichotomy necessitates a reform of
the law. Legislators could conceivably take mercy-killing entirely outside the scope of
criminal law, and thereby fulfill the aims of those advocating the legalization of
euthanasia. But in doing so, they are tacitly giving ethical approval to the act. A far
better approach would be to leave "involuntary" euthanasia under the full condemna-
tion of the criminal law, while at the same time recognizing the element of motive by
providing "voluntary" euthanasia with its own special niche in the law. Since a lesser
punishment would still attach, ethical approval would be withheld, the crime merely
being classified as less reprehensible than other forms of premeditated homicide. This
should eliminate the widespread and concerted refusal to enforce the penalties against
mercy-killers, and thereby bring the actual status of the mercy-killer back into juxta-
position with his conceptual status.
John C. Hirschfeld
SEARCH AND SEIZURE - PROBABLE CAUSE - TIP OF INFORMER HELD PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT. - Petitioner was arrested without a warrant
by a federal narcotics agent. Sole justification for the arrest, pursuant to the Narcotics
Control Act of 1956,1 was information from a paid informer of the Narcotics Bureau
who had proved reliable during six months of association with arresting officers. The
informer's description of the petitioner, including dress, baggage, and manner of
walking, and his prediction of the petitioner's time of arrival at the point of arrest,
were detailed and accurate. The arresting officers searched petitioner immediately after
the arrest and seized narcotics and implements used in narcotics addiction. At trial
petitioner moved to suppress this evidence on the ground that the search was incident
to an illegal arrest. Motion was denied by the trial court and petitioner's subsequent
conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals. On petition for writ of certiorari, held:
affirmed. Information from a reliable informer may be probable cause for arrest without
a warrant. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
An arrest without a warrant can only be made upon probable cause, and evidence
seized incident to an invalid arrest is not admissible in the federal courts.2 With some
dicta to the contrary,a probable cause for arrest or for search without a warrant does
not require evidence sufficient for conviction. 4 Probable cause has been interpreted to
89 See People ex rel. Milburn v. Nierstheimer, 401 111. 465, 82 N.E.2d 438 (1948); People v.
Lueckfield, 396 Ill. 520, 72 N.E.2d 198 (1947).
40 Holmstedt v. Holmstedt, 383 M11. 290, 49 N.E.2d 25, 28 (1943).
41 See Silving, supra note 2, at 350.
1 70 Stat. 570 (1956), 26 U.S.C. § 7607 (Supp. V, 1958).
2 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3 See, e.g., Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932).
4 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
212 (1813).
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mean reasonable grounds under the circumstances. 5 The existence of probable cause
has been found where the officer's information was drawn from his personal knowledge 6
or observation, 7 or where guilt has been reasonably inferred from the suspect's flight 8
Statutes defining the arrest power of narcotics agents9 and agents of the FBI10 do not
enlarge the construction of probable cause in the fourth amendment." However, a
recent Fifth Circuit decision has construed the Narcotics Control Act as eliminating the
necessity for a judicial determination of probable cause and has upheld an arrest made
without a warrant two weeks after the arresting officer had sufficient information to
justify issuance of a warrant. 12
The courts have tended to test probable cause for arrest without a warrant by de-
ciding a posteriori whether a warrant could have been issued on the basis of the infor-
mation possessed by the officer before the arrest.' 3 If that test is applied, mere "belief"
by the officers 14 or information from undisclosed informers15 does not constitute
probable cause.
Approval of arrests made on the uncorroborated "tips" of informers has been re-
sisted by federal courts regardless of how accurate the information proved to be in the
subsequent search and seizure.' 6 An exception has been made in one case where in-
formation later proved to be "reliable and positive."' 7 In those cases which approve
arrests made without a warrant, the probable cause on which the arrest was based
usually involved corroboration by officers of the data given them by informers. In Wis-
niewski v. United States,'8 for instance, officers observed the suspect's criminal activity
before arrest. In Ard v. United States,19 Husty v. United States,20 and Carroll v.
United States,2 1 officers had prior personal knowledge of the suspects' criminal activity;
and in United States v. Li Fat Tong,22 the suspect had a record of several previous
arrests and admitted his guilt before he was arrested. These cases frequently included
dicta that information from informers would not, standing alone, justify arrest.28 In
several instances personal observation by officers has not validated an arrest made
after an investigation when the investigation was initiated as a result of a "tip" which
the courts considered unreliable.24
The instant decision adds prestige to the informer's role by recognizing his word as
a basis of probable cause, subject to confirmation by the arresting officer. It appears
G Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878).
6 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
7 United States v. Kansco, 252 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1958).
8 United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied sub nom. Cyrne v. United
States, 326 U.S. 727 (1945).
9 70 Stat. 570 (1956), 26 U.S.C. § 7607 (Supp. V, 1958) ("reasonable grounds").
10 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1952).
11 United States v. Volkell, 251 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 962 (1958);
United States v. Walker, 246 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1957); United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639
(W.D. Ky. 1931); cf. Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878).
12 Dailey v. United States, 261 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1958); cf. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. 56 (1950).
13 Worthington v. United States, 166 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v. Horton, 86 F.
Supp. 92 (W.D. Mich. 1949).
'4 Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
15 Schencks v. United States, 2 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
16 Contee v. United States, 215 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1954); United States v. Castle, 138 F. Supp.
436 (D.D.C. 1955). But see Wrightson v. United States, 236 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1956); United
States v. Jackson, 159 F. Supp. 845 (D.D.C. 1958).
17 King v. United States, 1 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1924).
18 47 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1931).
19 54 F.2d 358 (5th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 550 (1932).
20 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
21 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
22 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1945).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 114 F. Supp. 441 (D.D.C. 1953).
24 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); United States v. Lee, 83 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.
1936); Wakkuri v. United States, 67 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1933).
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that the officer must both first believe that the informer is reliable, and then confirm
by personal observation at least part of what the informer tells him. However, this
personal observation need not be of criminal activity. The officer is apparently per-
mitted to infer that the informer's prediction that a crime will be committed is accurate
if other detailed descriptive information proves to be accurate.
The instant decision leaves indefinite the precise legal status of informers in
federal law enforcement. However, the right to report criminal activity, and to be
free from intimidation 25 or civil prosecution 26 as a result, is firmly established. The
government has been required to disclose the names of informers when such informa-
tion is necessary for an adequate defense,27 when the informer's words.have been re-
peated in testimony, 28 or when the informer has been used to trap the defendant.2 9 In
the absence of one of these circumstances, "public policy forbids disclosure of an in-
former's identity." 0
Conceding the necessity for prompt action in many narcotics cases, there is no
necessity for pre-empting judicial determination of probable cause where, as in this
case, there is time and opportunity to obtain a warrant. The statute defining the arrest
power of FBI agents3l has been construed more narrowly than the provisions of the
Narcotics Control Act 32 although the language is almost identical.33 This may indicate
that the judiciary considers narcotics violations more critical than other federal crimes.
There is, however, the danger that law enforcement officials will ignore constitutional
safeguards when the courts give them the opportunity.3 4 An officer employed to invade
privacy is not the most reliable judge of when to respect it.
Thomas L. Shaffer
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE - DISQUALIFICATION - RESIGNATION PURSUANT
TO SENIORITY PROVISION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT PRECLUDES EM-
PLOYEE FROM COMPENSATION. - Claimant, though a member of the international,
was a non-member of a local union, working as a moving picture projectionist under
a permit issued by the local union. He resigned his position in obedience to an order
of the local union's business agent issued pursuant to a seniority regulation which
provided that non-members had no seniority status in the local union and were subject
to being displaced by any local union member unemployed through no fault of his
own. The regulation was part of a collective bargaining agreement between the em-
ployer and the local union; the employer was required to comply strictly with the
regulation in making all changes of employees. Claimant subsequently applied for work
at the state employment office and filed a claim for benefits, which was granted by the
Commissioner of Employment Security. On certiorari, held, reversed. Employment dis-
continued in accordance with seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
25 In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895).
26 Vogel v. Grauz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884).
27 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
28 United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639 (W.D. Ky. 1937).
29 Portomene v. United States, 221 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1955).
30 Scher v. United States, 303 U.S. 251 (1938); cf. Cannon v. United States, 158 F.2d 952
(5th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 839 (1947); Nichols v. United States, 176 F.2d 431 (8th Cir.
1949).
31 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (1952).
32 70 Stat 570 (1956), 26 U.S.C. § 7607 (Supp. V, 1958).
33 United States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1951); United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629(2d Cir. 1950).
34 Cf. the detailed statistical survey of arrest practices in seven eastern states in Tresolini,
Taylor & Barnett, Arrest Without Warrant: Extent and Social Implications, 46 J. CRrM. L., C. & P. S.
187 (1955).
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is voluntary and without good cause attributable to the employer within the meaning
of MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.09(1) (1959).1 Anson v. Fisher Amusement Corp., 93
N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1958).
The problem of interlacing unemployment compensation laws with the demands
required of the employee by labor law and the union movement has resulted in numer-
ous cases of statutory construction. The usual case involves a claim for compensation
from an employee who terminated his employment because of some sort of labor dis-
pute, e.g., wages or working conditions.2 Most unemployment compensation statutes
disqualify a claimant for benefits where employment termination is voluntary.3 How-
ever, to avoid a strained construction of the term "voluntary," most states have a special
disqualification provision for termination due to labor disputes even though the union
ordered the termination.4 This provision works well in the usual case, but it does
not include the cases which cannot be fit into the "labor dispute" category. Con-
sequently, a troublesome problem of construing the term "voluntary" arises when an
employee is required to terminate employment because of one or more provisions in
the collective bargaining agreement. Normally, whenever a union is designated as the
exclusive bargaining agent by a majority of the employees, union and non-union mem-
bers are bound by the provisions of an agreement between the union and the em-
ployer. Also non-union members employed during the life of the agreement and who
accept work under its provisions are similarly bound by it.5
Prior to the instant case, the Minnesota court had encountered this problem in
somewhat analagous situations involving plant shut-downs for vacation purposes and
compulsory retirement plans. In Jackson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,6 a
collective bargaining agreement provided for a plant shut-down for vacations, but
granted vacation pay only to those employees with one year's seniority. The employees
ineligible for vacation pay were denied unemployment compensation during the shut-
down because their unemployment was said to be "voluntary. ' ' 7 In its decision the
court adopted the reasoning of the Washington court in In re Buffelen s where the
claimants were said to have agreed to the plant shut-down through their bargaining
agent, the union, when the collective bargaining agreement contained a vacation shut-
down provision. They therefore were unemployed by their own election and were
ineligible for benefits.
1 The statute provides:
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: (1) if such individual voluntarily
and without good cause attributable to the employer discontinued his employment
with such employer....
2 For numerous cases involving this issue, see Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 291 (1953).
3 See, e.g., Asu. STAT. ANN. § 81-1106(a) (Supp. 1957) (voluntarily without good cause
connected with such work); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3315 (Supp. 1958) (voluntarily without good
cause attributable to such employment); IDAHO CODE § 72-1366(f) (Supp. 1957) (voluntarily with-
out good cause); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(a) (1950) (voluntarily without good cause); see
generally, Sanders, Disqualification for Unemployment Insurance, 8 VAD. L. Ruv. 307 (1955);
Kempfer, Disqualification for Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct, 55 YALE L.J. 147 (1946).
4 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 223(d) (Smith-Hurd 1950); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 288.040(4)
(Supp. 1958); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(d) (1950). The disqualification is usually applied only to
the employees who were participants in the labor dispute. But see Drylie v. Unemployment Com-
pensation Bd., 162 Pa. Super. 211, 56 A.2d 272 (1948),. where the term "voluntary" was used to
disqualify employees whose employment terminated because of a labor dispute.
5 Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Standard Coil Prod. Co., 136 Cal. App. 2d 919, 288 P.
2d 637, 639 (1955).
6 234 Minn. 52, 47 N.W.2d 449 (1951).
7 Accord, Mattey v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 164 Pa. Super. 36, 63 A.2d
429 (1949); Beaman v. Bench, 75 Ariz. 345, 256 P.2d 721 (1953); Moen v. Director of Div. of
Employment Security, 324 Mass. 216, 85 N.E.2d 779 (1949). But see Mss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151A,
§ 1(r) (2) (1949) altering the rule in the Moen case.
8 32 Wash. 2d 205, 201 P.2d 194 (1948). But see WAsH. REv. CODE § 50.20.115 (Supp. 1958)
changing the rule in this case.
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The Jackson rationale was followed in a similar case, Johnson v. LaGrange Shoe
Corp.9 However, this case differed with Jackson in that the collective bargaining agree-
ment did not expressly provide for a plant shut-down but it did authorize vacations
when the employees desired them. Because too many employees desired vacations at
the same time, the plant was forced to shut down. The court held that the union, as
agent for the employees, had impliedly agreed to the shut-down and therefore the em-
ployees ineligible for vacation pay were precluded from unemployment benefits under
the rule in the Jackson case.' 0 In passing, the court noted that the rule of In re Buflelen,
on which the Jackson case was based, had been overruled by statutory amendment.'1
However, the court felt that its decision was based on sound reasoning, and change, if
any, was a matter for the legislature.
Similar reasoning has been applied in cases involving employment termination
pursuant to a compulsory retirement plan in a collective bargaining agreement. In
Bergseth v. Zinsmaster Baking Co.,' 2 a majority of the court found that those em-
ployees who were forced to terminate their employment because of this plan did so
voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer.' s The majority
rejected the theory that the collective bargaining agreement was a waiver of unemploy-
ment benefits and therefore illegal under a provision in the act. 14 The dissenting opinion
followed the reasoning of the New Jersey court in Campbell Soup Co. v. Division of
Employment Security,' 5 where, under essentially the same facts, the court held that the
employee was involuntarily unemployed. The test applied was whether, at the time
of leaving employment, the decision to go or stay rested with the worker alone. The
court indicated that the unemployment compensation act was to be liberally construed
in order to further its remedial purposes and that it was irrelevant to consider whether
an employee was acting voluntarily through a union as his agent. The majority in
Bergseth rejected this reasoning on the ground that no weight was given to the collective
bargaining agreement by the New Jersey court.' 6 However, it should be noted that the
court in the Campbell case did consider the collective bargaining agreement. The
court stated that the agreement operated as an adverse surrender of benefits and was
inconsistent with the statutory objectives of unemployment compensation. 17
In light of its prior decisions the court in the instant case experienced no difficulty
in finding a "voluntary" termination. As in prior decisions, the act of the union was
considered the act of the employee. The policy of the act was said to provide benefits
only to persons "unemployed through no fault of their own."' 8 Equating "fault"
with "cause," the court stated that the test to distinguish voluntary from involuntary
unemployment was whether the employee directly or indirectly exercised a free-will
choice in the separation.' 9 Since the union was the agent of the employees and had
bargained for the seniority provision in.the collective bargaining agreement, the em-
ployee ratified the union's act by accepting employment under the auspices of the
9 244 Minn. 354, 70 N.W.2d 335 (1955).
10 Contra, Schettino v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 138 Conn. 253, 83
A.2d 217 (1951). Compare Golubski v. "Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 171 Pa.
Super. 634, 91 A.2d 315 (1952) with Hubbard v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation Comm'n,
328 Mich. 444, 44 N.W.2d 4 (1950).
11 See note 8 supra.
12 89 N.W.2d 172 (Minn. 1958).
13 Contra, Campbell Soup Co. v. Division of Employment Security, 13 N.J. 431, 100 A.2d 287
(1953). Cf. Krauss v. Karagheusian, Inc., 13 N.J. 447, 100 A.2d 277 (1953) (employee selected op-
tional retirement plan).
14 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.17(1) (1959) provides that "any agreement by an individual to
waive, release, or commute his rights to benefits or any other rights under sections 268.03 to 268.24
shall be void...."
15 13 N.J. 431, 100 A.2d 287 (1953).
16 89 N.W.2d at 176.
17 100'A.2d at 290.
18 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.03 (1959).
19 93 N.W.2d at 819.
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local union. The employee was therefore at fault and caused his own unemployment, dis-
qualifying him for unemployment benefits.
Aside from the questionableness of its "ratification" theory,2 0 the court's construc-
tion of the term voluntary cannot pass without criticism. This term has various mean-
ings in various situations. In a sense it must be admitted that the unemployment here
was voluntary, that the employee agreed to the condition of being "bumped" by his
senior. However, the employee agreed because he had to agree, in order to obtain em-
ployment in this particular industry. In this industry, as in many others involving closely-
knit unions, the senior members exact this condition in order to keep themselves in
employment and subjugate the junior and non-members. This is the scheme of many
present-day labor unions; to deny it is to accept a view prevalent twenty-five years
ago. It could be said that the employee could have refused to work under such condi-
tions; he could have looked elsewhere for work. But the instant union is not the only
union with this seniority provision. Claimant would have been confronted with the
same "choice" wherever he sought employment. As for the objection to charging
benefits to the employer's experience rating account,21 it can only be said that this is
part of the consideration he must pay in accepting this particular collective bargaining
agreement.
Perhaps the reluctance of the court to find an involuntary resignation under the
instant facts is based on the fear that union policy may dictate the distribution of unem-
ployment benefits.22 Even so, the approach taken is inconsistent with the basic purpose
of unemployment compensation, which is to ease the lurden of involuntary unem-
ployment by distribution of unemployment benefits. In determining whether separation
from employment was voluntary or involuntary, the test should be juridical, not meta-
physical. The court itself has recognized the validity of this approach. In Fannon v.
Federal Cartridge Corp.,25 the court reasoned that "fault" should not be interpreted
narrowly, in the sense of "culpability," but rather in the light of the broad social policy
behind the act. Technical subtlety, exercised with an eye to an employer's experience
rating table, has no place in the interpretation of a statute based on the needs of em-
ployees out of work.
If the rule of the instant case is followed, then any employee working under any
type of seniority provision, whether it be merely a union.regulation or part of a collect-
ive bargaining agreement, will be disqualified for unemployment benefits when he is
forced to leave his employment because of lack of seniority. Public policy obviously
does not dictate such a result.
W. R. Kennedy
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE - FIFTH AMENDMENT - DISQUALIFICATION FOR
REFUSAL TO ANSWER CHARoES OF COMMUNIST AFFILIATION. - Petitioner was
notified by his employer that he was suspended from employment and that his discharge
was pending because he was a security risk and had engaged in conduct detrimental to
the business interests of the company, then under defense contracts with the federal
government. Petitioner requested and was granted a company hearing on the question
of his discharge. At this hearing he refused to discuss the reason for pleading the fifth
amendment to charges of communist affiliations made against him before a con-
20 See Campbell Soup Co. v. Division of Employment Security, 13 NJ. 431, 100 A.2d 287
(1953).
21 The employer's contribution rate is raised when his experience rating ratio is raised. The
experience rating ratio is the quotient obtained by dividing the total benefits chargeable to the em-
ployer's account for the period by his total taxable payroll for the period. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
268.06(6), (8) (1959).
22 See Sanders, Disqualification for Unemployment Insurance, 8 VMAD. L. REv. 322 (1955).
28 219 Minn. 306, 18 N.W.2d 249 (1945).
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gressional committee. Petitioner was discharged and applied for unemployment com-
pensation. At the hearing before the unemployment compensation referee, he again
refused to answer questions concerning his alleged communist affiliations. Petitioner
appealed the board's denial of compensation. Held: affirmed. Claimant's refusal to
answer charges of communist affiliation while an employee of a company with defense
contracts was willful misconduct in connection with his employment. Also, his refusal
to answer the compensation referee's questions relevant to the claim constituted waiver
of the claim. Ault v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 188 Pa. Super. 260, 146 A.2d
729 (1958).
The decision in this case rested on two bases: 1) willful misconduct in connection
with employment, and 2) actions constituting waiver of the claim for compensation.
Generally, under state statutes, "misconduct in connection with employment," which is
the cause of discharge, will disqualify a claimant from the benefits of unemployment
compensation.' The Pennsylvania statute adds the requirement of "willful" misconduct. 2
In its analysis of the misconduct issue the instant court found willful misconduct in the
breach of a duty of employee to employer in refusing to answer sworn charges publicly
made against him. The duty imposed on public service employees to answer charges
affecting their office was apparently extended by this decision to employees of private
industries with defense contracts. The public service employee's duty of explaining
charges has long been recognized as a requirement of continuing employment.3 The
rationale seems to be that there is a privilege to refuse to answer, but that the privilege
does not include protection against loss of employment by virtue of the refusal. 4
Official action may not be taken on the implications that arise from refusal to answer,
but the person who avails himself of the privilege cannot expect to hold the same posi-
tion of public trust that was once vested in him. He is free from criminal prosecution,
but he is not free from public opprobrium. This sentiment was accentuated in a recent
Supreme Court decision concerning the discharge of a transit conductor. The Court
held that "lack of candor" on the part of the conductor under investigation for com-
munist affiliation evidenced sufficient doubt of his trust and reliability to constitute
grounds for discharge as a security risk.5 Collaterally, when school teachers refused to
answer charges of communist affiliation posed by the school board and invoked the
fifth amendment before a congressional committee, the Supreme Court upheld their
discharge. 6 The reasoning was that they had violated a public trust vested in them by
refusing to answer the questions.
The court in the instant case was reluctant to make communist affiliation mis-
conduct in itself. This is understandable since to do so the court would have bad to
conclude that the petitioner was a Communist which would have been an imputation of
guilt from refusal to answer. Furthermore, at present there is no statutory prohibition
of employment of a Communist by a defense contractor. The existing regulation only
requires a security clearance for employees having access to classified material.7 The
employer is allowed to give such clearance at low levels and there is no requirement to
discharge an employee who cannot secure clearance.8
1 As of 1958, forty-one states and the District of Columbia provided for disqualification from
unemployment compensation benefits for discharge due to "misconduct in connection with employ-
ment" of the claimant. Five states require "willful misconduct in connection with employment."
Delaware and Ohio specify disqualification for discharge for "good cause in connection with employ-
ment." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3315(2) (Supp. 1958); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4141.29C(17(4)
(Supp. 1958). West Virginia provides for disqualification for discharge due to misconduct without
reference to connection with employment. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2366(78) (1955).
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(e) (Supp. 1958).
3 Souder v. City of Philadelphia, 305 Pa. 1, 196 At. 245 (1931).
4 Christal v. Police Comm'r, 32 Cal. App. 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939).
5 Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468, 476 (1958).
6 Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Kaplan v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 388
Pa. 213, 130 A.2d 672 (1957).
7 32 C.F.1 §§ 67.1-2(c), 1-3(a) (Supp. 1958); see generally, 1 INDusTRLAL PERsoNNE SEcuRTY
Raviaw PRoGRAm REPORT 11 (1956).
8 See 32 C.F.R. § 67.1-3(b) (Supp. 1959); REPORT OF THE SPEcIAL CoMMITTEE ON THE
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Although the question of communist affiliation as misconduct was not faced by
the court, the probable result may be inferred from a decision handed down by the
instant court on the same day as the Ault decision. In Darin v. Unemployment Com-
pensation Bd.,9 the claimant had been discharged without any company hearings for
alleged communist affiliation. The claimant refused to tell the unemployment compen-
sation board whether she had communist affiliations and was disqualified for not
answering questions relevant to her claim. The question of communist affiliation became
relevant to her claim even though the claimant committed no positive acts of misconduct.
The relevancy must stem from the implication that party membership is misconduct
which should result in discharge. Thus, in order to determine whether the company dis-
charged the claimant for misconduct, it was necessary to determine whether the claimant
was a Communist or not.
In equating industries engaged in defense work with public service organizations, it
might be supposed that the instant court was partially swayed by the aforementioned
regulations as to clearance for employees working for defense plants. The court stated:
Every patriotic citizen would expect an employer engaged in defense work to ask
an employee whether such charges are true, and would expect an employee to discuss
such charges frankly and honestly with his employer ....
The claimant in this case refused to frankly and fully discuss with his employer
the sworn charges of misconduct which had been made publicly against him. This
refusal was a willful disregard of the employer's interests and a disregard of the stand-
ards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect.lo (Emphasis added.)
Thus petitioner's "lack of candor" as expressed in Lerner v. Casey" was said to be
within the traditional judicial definition of willful misconduct 12 if the claimant's em-
ployer were involved in defense contracts.
Ordinarily, if the misconduct fell within the express or implied terms of the em-
ployment contract it was held to be in connection with employment.' 3 However, since
the misconduct in the instant case was a refusal to answer company questions, it was
necessary to connect this refusal with the employment to fulfill the statutory dis-
qualification provision. In answer the court said, "Communist Party activity is a matter
connected with work of an employee in a manufacturing concern with government
orders."' 4 Therefore, the court held that there was a duty on the part of such an
employer to determine whether his employees were Communist or not. The court
would have more rightly said that suspicion of communist activity was connected with
such employment and that refusal to dismiss the suspicion was misconduct because it
disregarded the employer's interests. However, again this would presuppose the im-
putation of guilt from refusal to answer; the court very nicely avoided this awkward
inference by stressing a clarification of actual party membership.
Moreover, the court noted that the claimant's conduct 1) threatened his employer
with loss of defense contracts, 2) aroused fellow employees which caused work stoppage,
and 3) created unfavorable publicity for the company. These factors were also said to
connect the misconduct with the employment. The first point leads to two implications
of questionable validity. Since there is no proof of communist affiliation, the refusal
to answer must in fact cause a presumption of untrustworthiness which is the foundation
FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM OF THE AssocIATIoN OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw
YORK 64-65 (1956).
9 146 A.2d 740 (Pa. 1958).
10 146 A.2d at 734.
11 357 U.S. 468, 476 (1958).
12 See Moyer v. Unemployment Compensation Bd., 177 Pa. Super. 72, 110 A.2d 753, 754 (1955):
'Willful misconduct' is not defined in the law but it has been held to com-
prehend an act of wanton or willful disregard of the employer's interest, a deliberate
violation of the employer's rules, or negligence indicating an intentional disregard
of the employer's interest or of the employee's duties and obligations to the
employer.
13 Sewell v. Sharp, 102 So. 2d 259 (La. 1958); Chalker v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 71
Ohio L. Abs. 87, 126 N.E.2d 457 (1955).
14 146 A.2d at 735.
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for the dismissal of public service employees. Also, the invocation of the constitutional
privilege must impute guilt because the government supposedly would not withdraw the
contracts unless there were a Communist working for the company with access to
classified information. As to the second ground for establishing connection, it is difficult
to grasp the notion that the expressed or implied contract of employment creates a
duty on the employee to insure industrial tranquility. Work stoppage is a matter that is
beyond the control of the individual employee, and to make it a connecting link to his
particular employment introduces a somewhat strained theory of causation.
The question of unfavorable publicity as relating to connection with employment
was dealt with in Fino v. Maryland Employment Security Bd.15 This court held that
invocation of the fifth amendment before a congressional committee might be grounds
for discharge if it caused unfavorable publicity to the employer. However, it refused to
disqualify the claimant, a waitress in a restaurant, because the misconduct was not
connected with the employment, if there were misconduct at all. The Maryland court
indicated that the misconduct must be connected with the particular job performed by
the individual. If the employee performs satisfactorily, but because of extenuating
circumstances causes bad publicity, the Maryland court apparently will affirm the dis-
charge but is not ready to disqualify the individual from unemployment benefits.
The second basis for petitioner's disqualification in the present case was his refusal
to answer relevant questions put to him by the unemployment compensation board. The
principle followed was that a claimant may not testify to facts which will justify his
claim and then refuse to testify to matters which might defeat his claim. Here an in-
consistency arises in the decision. Granting the soundness of the principle, it still must
be determined what questions were relevant to the claim so as to make them fit questions
to be put to the employee. The court refused to imply that the instant claimant was a
Communist and that Communist Party membership in itself was grounds for dis-
qualification. 1 6 They said that the misconduct was the refusal to answer questions asked
by the company board. Therefore, it is submitted that as far as the unemployment
compensation board was concerned, the membership or lack of membership in the
Communist Party was completely irrelevant to the claim. The only relevant point was
whether the claimant refused to answer questions put to him by the company board.
These queries, it may be assumed, he was prepared to answer. If the court is to be
consistent with its first premise for disqualification, the questions concerning petitioner's
party .membership must be irrelevant. Therefore, his refusal to answer those questions
could not be the basis of an abandonment of his claim.
In summary, the instant case evidences an extension of the status of private
industry engaged in defense contracts to that of a quasi-public organization. The
security risk in having a Communist in a defense plant is considered so serious that
the charge of communist affilication imposes a duty on the accused to exonerate himself
or suffer the consequences of loss of employment and unemployment benefits. It would
seem that the suggestion of guilt arising out of the exercise of the fifth amendment by
the accused has been made a rule of law in reference to such persons working in defense
plants.
Further decisions indicate that the bases upon which the decision rest are exclusive
of each other and may stand alone. In Ostrofsky v. Maryland Employment Security
Bd.,17 refusal to answer questions of the company board concerning charges of com-
munist affiliation was held to be disqualifying misconduct even though no similar
questions were asked by the unemployment compensation board. In Darin v. Unemploy-
ment Compensation Bd.,' 8 the company discharged the claimant solely on the basis of
15 147 A.2d 738 (Md. 1959).
10 Ohio automatically disqualifies anyone who "advocates, or is a member of a party which
advocates, the overthrow of our government by force .... OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29C(4)
(Supp. 1958).
1-1 147 A.2d 741 (Md. 1959).
18 146 A.2d 740 (Pa. 1958).
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the claimant's refusal to answer questions concerning communist affiliation put to her
by the unemployment compensation board. She was held to have waived her claim.
However, it is submitted that the tenability of the position that a claimant is dis-
qualified for refusal to answer questions asked by the company board destroys the
tenability of the position that refusal to answer the questions of the unemployment
compensation board is a waiver of his claim. The dubious validity of the instant court's
conclusion of willful misconduct, in that it is founded on unwarranted implications from
a constitutional privilege and the misconduct's tenuous connection with employment,
joined with the inconsistency of the "waiver of claim" argument would suggest that the
coming appeal may be rewarded with a reversal.19
John R. Martzell
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - FEDERAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ACT - INJURED
'TWILIGHT-ZONE" EMPLOYEE HAS RIGHT To BRING NEGLIGENCE ACTION UNDER
STATE LAW. - Petitioner, a waterfront employee, was injured while working on a barge
in navigable waters. Compensation was available to him under the Federal Longshore-
men's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act.' Petitioner's employer had made pro-
vision for payment of compensation as required by this act2 but had elected not to be
subject to the Oregon Workmen's Compensation Act. Petitioner brought a negligence
action against the employer pursuant to a provision in the Oregon statute permitting
the action when an employer had chosen not to participate in the state workmen's com-
pensation jolan.3 -The Oregon Supreme Court held that petitioner's sole remedy was
under the Longshoremen's Act.4 On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, held, re-
versed. A waterfront employee injured in the "twilight zone" has an election to recover
compensation under either the Longshoremen's Act or the applicable state workmen's
compensation law. Therefore, petitioner could maintain the negligence action for
damages permitted by the Oregon statute. Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358
U.S. 272 (1959).
Prior to the enactment of the Longshoremen's Act, the Supreme Court in 1917 had
held in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen5 that a state workmen's compensation statute, if
applied to maritime injuries, would unconstitutionally interfere with the proper harmony
and uniformity of maritime law envisaged by the exclusive federal jurisdiction granted
by the Constitution. In 1927, after two unconstitutional attempts by Congress to allow
recovery under state compensation statutes,6 the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act was passed creating federal compensation protection for employees
injured while engaged in maritime employment on the navigable waters of the United
States "if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation pro-
ceedings may not be validly provided by state law."
19 The instant case has been appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. It will be argued
the week of May 25, 1959.
1 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1952).
2 Id. § 932.
3 Oma. REv. STAT. §§ 656.022, 656.024 (1957).
4 Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 320 P.2d 668 (Ore. 1958).
5 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
6 40 Stat. 395 (1917), giving claimants in admiralty cases the rights and remedies available under
state law, was struck down as an unconstitutional delegation in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,
253 U.S. 149 (1920). 42 Stat. 634 (1922) differed by exempting masters and members of crews, but
it met a similar fate in Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
7 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1952).
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Interpreting these words in light of the cases subsequent to the Jensen decision, the
courts at first held the remedies of the federal act and the state statutes to be mutually
exclusive.8 The problem of drawing the line between state and federal jurisdiction,
however, was very troublesome, often depending upon analysis not only of whether an
accident occurred on navigable water or on land,9 but also whether it was a matter of
mere local concern or one of special relation to commerce and navigation. 10 The strict
logic that only the state or the federal government, but not both, had jurisdiction in a
given situation, worked harsh results upon the employee who found, after the statute
of limitations had run, that he had initiated his recovery under the wrong scheme of
remedies.1 Presumably, the cautious employee would have to begin actions in
both jurisdictions simultaneously. 12
In 1942 the Supreme Court in Davis v. Department of Labor's adopted what has
subsequently come to be known as the "twilight-zone" rule. The Court declared that
the line between activities falling within state or federal jurisdiction was so "undefined
and undefinable" that presumptive weight should be given to an assumption of jurisdic-
tion by either state or federal authorities.14 The meaning of the Davis decision became
further clarified by two subsequent cases which originated under state statutes. In each
case a shipyard worker was injured under circumstances indistinguishable from those
which, prior to Davis, had been held to be exclusively within federal jurisdiction. 15 In
Massachusetts, state compensation was allowed in Moores' Case,16 where Davis was
read as a revolutionary decision which created a concurrent jurisdictional overlap for
both the state and federal courts in all waterfront cases involving aspects pertaining both
to land and sea if a reasonable argument could be made either way. The court felt that
even though there might be an apparent weight of authority one way or the other, the
problem after Davis was not to find the single line between state and federal authority,
but instead, to fix the boundaries of the new "twilight zone." Meanwhile, in California,
state compensation was denied in Baskin v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n17 on the ground
that the case was not within the "twilight zone" since the earlier precedents were un-
equivocal. Both cases reached the Supreme Court where Moores was affirmed in a per
curiam decision citing Davis,'8 and the Baskin case was remanded for further con-
sideration in the light of Moores.19 On remand, the California court sent the case back
8 E.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Lawson, 64 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1933).
9 Compare T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.S. 179 (1928) (man drowned by being
knocked from wharf held to have been injured on land), with Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co.,
295 U.S. 647 (1935) (man knocked from vessel to wharf held to have been injured on water).
10 Compare Martinson v. State Indus. Ace. Comm'n, 154 Ore. 423, 60 P.2d 972 (1936) (work-
man loading barge not covered by state compensation), with Mark v. Portland Gravel Co., 130
Ore. 11, 278 Pac. 986 (1929) (engineer injured on dredge in navigable waters is covered by state
compensation).
11 Ayers v. Parker, 15 F. Supp. 447 (D. Md. 1936).
12 The Longshoremen's Act provides that the statute of limitations shall not begin to run until
the termination of a suit at law or in admiralty, but it makes no such allowance if the suit is brought
under state compensation proceedings. 44 Stat. 1432 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 913(d) (1952).
13 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
14 Davis v. Department of Labor, supra note 13, at 255-56. Typical of the cases which caused
uncertainty was Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244 (1941), in which recovery under the
federal act was granted to an employee whose handyman duties for a boat sales firm were almost
entirely on land, but who was drowned while testing an outboard motor on navigable waters. The
Court stressed that the criterion was the character of the activity engaged in at the moment of the
injury and not the usual duties of the employee. Professor Larson later suggested that this appeared
to scrap the "local" exception to maritime employment, since this casual relationship to navigation
and commerce "might seem to approach the vanishing point." 2 LARSON, WORKMfEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 89.23(b) (1952).
15 See John Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930).
16 323 Mass. 162, 80 N.E.2d 478, aff'd per curiam sub nom. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 335
U.S. 874 (1948).
17 89 Cal. App. 632, 201 P.2d 549 (1949).
1s Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874 (1948).
19 Baskin v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 338 U.S. 854 (1949).
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to the Commission with directions to take jurisdiction. 20 In cases subsequent to Moores,
the jurisdiction chosen by the injured employee has been generally upheld when the issue
was simply a determination of the applicable compensation act.
2 1
Various collateral problems have arisen from this peculiar concurrent jurisdiction
principle. One such problem results when an employee has recovered under a state
statute and then seeks to recover under the federal act. This has been permitted, but
the state award was required to be credited against any federal award obtained.22 On
the other hand, when federal payments were secured first, the employee has been denied
the right to bring a subsequent action under the state statute.23 Also, there is an indica-
tion that concurrent jurisdiction will not be extended to other systems. In a case in-
volving a railway brakeman, injured while working on a freight car situated on a car
float in navigable water, the Supreme Court, relying on Jensen, refused the employee an
action under FELA and held that his sole remedy was under the Longshoremen's Act.
24
In a situation similar to that faced by the instant court, the federal district court for
Oregon had previously held that the "twilight-zone" doctrine did not include a choice
between an action for damages under state law and a recovery of federal compensa-
tion.25 An injured worker's sole remedy was said to be under the Longshoremen's Act
and a common law action could not be maintained. "The Act," the court said, "is
automatic except in the limited circumstances provided for in the Act. Coverage under
a State Workmen's Compensation Law is necessary to avoid automatic coverage under
the Act."2
6
The Oregon Workmen's Compensation Act provides that an employer who rejects
the act is liable in an action by an employee for injuries occasioned by the employer's
negligence, default or wrongful act as if the act had not been passed, and the tradi-
tional common law defenses of fellow servant, contributory negligence and assumption
of risk are removed.27 Counsel for petitioner urged that the Oregon act should apply
in toto, that is, since the employee had an election to bring his action under either the
federal or state law when injured in the "twilight zone," the negligence action under
state law should be considered as part of the state statutory remedy arising when the
employer had elected not to participate in the state fund. 28 The Supreme Court con-
firmed this reasoning in its summary opinion in the instant case.
The dissent in the instant case, with an evident eye on the seeming injustice to
the employer, rebelled at this extention of Davis. It recognized the "theoretic illogic"
of Davis in allowing the employee to recover under either the federal or state statute,29
but felt that this illogical reasoning, permitted in the interests of assuring the employee
simple, prompt protection, should not be extended to allow a negligence action when
the employer was not covered under the state compensation statute. In a word, Davis
should end with the ability of the claimant to obtain a compensation award. However,
the dissent neglected to consider the sanction needed to enforce compliance with com-
20 Baskin v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 97 Cal. App. 2d 257, 217 P.2d 733 (1950). For a more
complete discussion of the foregoing history see 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 14, at §§ 89.00-89.25;
Rodes, Workmen's Compensation for Maritime Employees: Obscurity in the Twilight Zone, 68 HARV.
L. REv. 637 (1955).
21 2 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 14, at § 89.40.
22 Western Boat Bldg. Co. v. O'Leary, 198 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1952); Newport News Shipbuild-
ing & Dry Dock Co. v. O'Hearne, 192 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1951).
23 Dunleavy v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Docks, 17 N.J. Super. 76, 85 A.2d 343 aff'd per curiam, 20
N.J. Super 486, 90 A.2d 84 (1951).
24 Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334 (1953); Scrinko v. Reading Co., 117 F. Supp.
603 (D.NJ. 1954).
25 Chappell v. C. D. Johnson Lumber Corp., 112 F. Supp. 625 (D. Ore. 1953), rev'd on other
grounds, 216 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1955).
26 112 F. Supp. at 627.
27 ORE. REv. STAT. § 656.024 (1957). Substantially similiar provisions exist under the Federal
Longshoremen's Act. 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1952).
28 Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 320 P.2d 668 (Ore. 1958). See also Rodes, supra
note 20.
29 Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 259 (1942) (concurring opinion).
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pensation statutes. Removal of the traditional common law defenses was intended to be
a sanction against employers who did not comply with such statutes.30 Every compensa-
tion statute immunizes complying employers against this type of negligence action.
Since the employer in the instant situation was possibly subject to both state and federal
jurisdiction, it should have insured under both acts. For a small premium such an em-
ployer can obtain a "Longshoremen's Endorsement" on his state compensation insurance.
In state-fund jurisdictions, the contributions can be reduced, since provision is made
for protection in accordance with the amount of time spent on land and on water.31
Because the "twilight zone" is a legal reality, employers should protect themselves against
the possibilities of liability under state or federal law. Thus, hardship would only occur
in the case of either the maritime or the land employer who had no reason to foresee
that his employees might be injured in the "twilight zone."
By giving the employee a jurisdictional option in the "twilight zone," the Davis,
Moores, and Baskin decisions solved the employee's jurisdictional dilemma in cases
where an honest confusion concerning the applicable compensation plan existed. But
at the same time it created the future problem of determining the limit to which the
employee would be able to push the boundaries of the "twilight zone" in maneuvering
for the highest possible award. For instance, the federal act also makes allowance for
a negligence action,3 2 as a sanction against the non-complying employer. Consequently,
a situation exactly converse to the instant case is possible. The employer may be covered
under the state compensation statute but not under the federal plan, and the injured
"twilight zone" employee may bring a negligence action under the federal statute. Ana-
lytically, it seems there would be no reason why the instant case would not sustain juris-
diction in the hypothetical.3 3
The history of this issue has shown the gradual yielding of the highly artificial dis-
tinctions made as a result of the theory of mutual exclusiveness to the broader policy of
allowing the employee a choice of remedies when he is injured in the "twilight zone."
The remaining problem will be defining the policy limitations on this choice. Although
the extension of Davis to provide a common law remedy when a compensation award
was available may be questionable at first glance, it does seem warranted in light of the
broad policy considerations of the compensation acts involved. If the "twilight zone" is
permitted to exist, the collateral problems arising from the rule must conform to these
policy considerations.
John F. Beggan
30 See Sullivan v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 331 P.2d 602 (Nev. 1958).
31 2 LAnsoN, op. cit. supra note 14, at § 89.60 n.5, citing Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v.
Department of Labor, 185 Wash. 349, 54 P.2d 1003 (1936).
32 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1952).
33 In such a situation, standard provisions for workmen's compensation and employers' liability
policies would apparently cover the liability, since such policies normally cover "all sums the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay," excluding those sums recoverable under other work-
men's compensation laws.
